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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1962 Cuban missile agreement represents an ongoing Soviet-
American political arrangement concerning Cuba, rather than a concise,
formal compact. Since October 1962 there have been several United
States-USSR diplomatic exchanges, the sum of which constitutes the
* An earlier version of this Article was presented at a program of the National
Association of Cuban-American Women and the Graduate School of International Studies
Research Institute for Cuban Studies at the University of Miami on November 21, 1987.
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agreement.' The 1962 understandings consist, at a minimum, of three
memoranda of conversations between different United States-Soviet rep-
resentatives in Washington and New York. However, generally accepted
public statements consist of an exchange of letters between Chairman
Nikita S. Khruschev and President John F. Kennedy.2 The "non-inte-
grated memorandum" nature of such a sensitive agreement as the 1962
Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba is not remarkable. For example,
the 1957 Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula was reached in part
through President Dwight D. Eisenhower's assurance that the Gulf of
Aquaba would remain open as an international waterway. Diplomatic
exchanges, as well as public statements, formed this understanding. 3
Chairman Khruschev's October 28, 1962, letter to President Ken-
nedy linked dismantling of Soviet missiles in Cuba-under United Na-
tions, not United States, supervision-to American assurances against an
invasion of Cuba.4 Khruschev thereby responded to President Ken-
nedy's October 27, 1962, letter to Khruschev and proposed a trade-off.'
Kennedy's October 28, 1962, public statement tied "United Nations ver-
ification" to American "reciprocal measures to assure peace in the Carib-
bean area."' 6 Kennedy's November 2, 1962, public address on Cuba
likewise anticipated a "satisfactory international means of verification'"
of the dismantling of Soviet missiles. Kennedy's November 20, 1962,
statement on Cuba, addressed "appropriate United Nations observation
and supervision ' 8 of the dismantling of Soviet weaponry in Cuba.
Dr. Abram Chayes, United States State Department Legal Advisor
from 1961 to 1964, asserts that the 1962 Cuban missile crisis Washing-
ton, D.C. decisionmakers made a considerable effort to integrate legal
factors into their deliberations.9 Whether or not Dr. Chayes' assertion
was accurate, the instant discussion will first reveal that the constitu-
tional tools with which to assail the 1962 agreement are not within the
1. 131 Cong. Rec. E. 414 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1985).
2. D. NEWSOM, THE SOVIET BRIGADE IN CUBA: A STUDY IN POLITICAL DIPLOMACY
25 (1987).
3. L. JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE POINT: PERSPECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENCY 1963-1969,
288-89 (1971). In 1967 President Johnson consulted with former President Eisenhower to
ascertain the scope of the 1957 understanding. Id. at 291.
4. R. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 205, 207
(1969).
5. Id. at 202-03.
6. Id. at 212.
7. Id. at 215.
8. Id. at 216.
9. A. CHAYE, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE
OF LAW 100 (1974).
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judiciary. The initial portion of the discussion assumes arguendo that the
1962 understanding is an executive agreement. Further, this discussion
will reveal that President Kennedy appears to have acted constitutionally
rendering his agreement safe from modem judicial assault. However, the
instant inquiry will substantiate that efforts in the political branch do
remain viable.
II. EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
A. The Executive Agreement
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties'" fails to differ-
entiate between treaties and other forms of international commitments. 1
Additionally, the difference between an executive agreement and a com-
munique is unclear.
An executive agreement seems to be: 1) a statement by the execu-
tive; 2) directing a policy course intended by the United States; 3) com-
municated to a foreign state either orally or in writing; 4) executed with
or without Congressional approval.12 There is, at least, substantial con-
sensus that an executive agreement is a Presidential (or Presidentially-
authorized) agreement with the authorized representative of a foreign
country, which is not approved by the Senate before it takes effect. 3
There are four types of executive agreements. The first includes
agreements having prior Congressional approval. The judiciary usually
finds approval when it has been expressed or implied in an earlier statute.
The second includes executive agreements unilaterally made by the Presi-
dent and thereafter (as by joint resolution) approved by Congress. The
third includes executive agreements authorized by prior treaty. The last
are sole-executive agreements enjoying neither prior nor subsequent Con-
gressional approval.14
10. 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969).
11. Wolfinger, Comment, United States-China Relations" Has President Reagan's Com-
munique Revised International Obligations Towards Taiwan?, 14 CAL- W. INT'L LJ. 326, 334-
35 (1984).
12. Id. at 336.
13. L. MARGOLIS, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS IN FOREIGN POLICY 24, 25 (1986). This
definition will be herein applied arguendo to the 1962 situation, although such policy declara-
tions as, e.g., the Teheran and Yalta agreements (39 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 105 (1945)), proba-
bly lack any status at all, let alone the status in American law of executive agreements.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 144, Re-
porters' Note 2 (1965). Cf. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 52, 177
(1972).
14. Wolfinger, supra note 11, at 338; 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.8, at 395 (1986); R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CON-
STITUTIONAL MYTH 142-43 (1974).
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B. The Sole-Executive Agreement
The Constitution expressly defines treaty procedures and does not
indicate other means for making international agreements. 15 Nonethe-
less, it is widely accepted that a Congressional-executive agreement is a
legitimate alternative to a treaty.16 Furthermore, the President undoubt-
edly has authority to make some sole-executive agreements, e.g., under
his authority as Commander-in-Chief or his authority to receive foreign
ambassadors and recognize foreign governments. 1 "The precise scope of
the President's power to conclude international agreements without the
consent of the Senate remains unresolved."'1
8
The broad Presidential discretion exercised in the 1962 missile crisis
is not inconsistent with the broad Congressional discretion exercised in
the Boland Amendment which was added to the continuing appropria,
tions resolution for fiscal year 1985, effective from October 12, 1984, to
September 30, 1985.19
The Boland Amendment provides that:
[d]uring fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of
the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or
expended for the purpose of which would have the elrect of supporting,
directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua
by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.20
According to the Constitution, "No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a
regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
public Money shall be published from time to time."'" Furthermore, the
Constitution provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States. ..."I' The Congress, as
15. L. HENKIN, supra note 13, at 174.
16. Id. at 175.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
18. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-5, at 228 (2d. ed. 1988).
19. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066 (1984). This is "the" Boland Amendment, Miami Her-
ald, June 7, 1987, at 6C.
20. Id. The other four Boland Amendments are variously phrased and are of varied spe-
cific policy aims. Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793 (1982); Pub. L. No. 99-88, § 106(a) (1985); Pub, L.
No. 99-169, § 105 (1985); and Pub. L. No. 99-569, § 106 (1986); Crovitz, Crime, the Constitu-
tion, and the Iran-Contra Affair, Commentary, October 1987, at 23.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
22. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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exemplified in the Boland Amendment, exercises the power of the purse
and not the sword.
A sole-executive agreement reached without reference to either
treaty or Congressional enactment may validly deal with any issue which
under the Constitution falls within the independent powers of the Presi-
dent.23 Such an agreement must be of international concern and not in
contravention of any constitutionally imposed limits-such as the Bill of
Rights.24 The 1962 agreement plainly is of international concern and not
beyond the bounds set by the Constitution.
Similar agreements have been made by past presidents. When Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933 established diplomatic relations with
the USSR, he agreed that the Soviets would take no steps to enforce So-
viet claims against American nationals. Such claims were assigned to the
United States with the understanding that the Soviets would be notified
of all amounts realized. The United States Supreme Court upheld the
validity of this agreement. 25 The Supreme Court noted that there are
many international compacts distinct from those treaties actually requir-
ing Senatorial advice and consent:26 "That the negotiations, acceptance
of the assignment and agreements and understandings in respect thereof
were within the competence of the President may not be doubted."'
In 1977 United States Senator Robert Dole sued to enjoin delivery
of the crown of Hungary (in American keeping since 1945) from the
United States to the People's Republic of Hungary pursuant to a 1977
executive agreement. 28 He asserted a violation of the Senate's Constitu-
tional right to concur in or veto treaties. Senator Dole's effort to enjoin
President Carter failed because of the broad Presidential authority2 9 and
because the executive agreement was not a "treaty" within the meaning
of the Constitution.30 "[B]y common practice from the beginning of the
Republic, treaties have customarily exhibited such fundamental charac-
teristics as substantial ongoing defense or political commitments on the
part of the United States and substantial ongoing reciprocal commit-
ments by co-signers."31
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 121 (1965).
24. Id. § 117.
25. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 325-27 (1937).
26. Id. at 330-31.
27. Id. at 330.
28. Dole v. Carter, 444 F. Supp. 1065, 1066-67 (D. Kans. 1977).
29. Id. at 1068-70.
30. Id. at 1070-71.
31. Id. at 1070.
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A sole-executive agreement becomes effective as municipal law of
the United States at the time it becomes binding upon the United States.
The agreement supersedes inconsistent state law but does not supersede
inconsistent provisions of earlier acts of Congress.32 By contrast, a self-
executing treaty is valid municipal law having legal precedence over ear-
lier federal statutes.33 Yet note that it has been suggested that when the
President enters into an agreement pursuant to his inherent Presidential
powers in the foreign relations area, his agreement must prevail over
even these earlier Congressional enactments. 34 A sole-executive agree-
ment, however, cannot be self-executing to the extent that it involves
governmental action that under the Constitution can be taken only by
Congress.35
III. REMEDIES TO THE SOLE-EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENT
A. The Congressional Remedy to the Sole-Executive Agreement
Congressional enactments passed after an executive agreement be-
comes effective supersede the agreement if the enactment is inconsistent,
and if the Congressional intent to supersede the agreement is clearly ex-
pressed. 36 However, the superseding of the agreement as municipal law
of the United States via such a subsequent Congressional enactment can-
not affect the international obligations of the United States under the
agreement. 37 Therefore, for municipal legal purposes Congress can uni-
laterally repudiate the 1962 Kennedy-Khruschev agreement; two-thirds
of both houses of Congress can do so even over a Presidential veto.38
This affords a political means for Congress to reverse the 1962
agreement as municipal law. In this regard, a presumably still valid
39
Congressional resolution of 1962 already declares a policy against the
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 144(1) (1965).
33. 1 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.7,
at 392 (1986).
34. Id. at § 6.8, at 401.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 144 (2), § 141 (3).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 145 (1) (1965).
37. Id. § 145 (2). Cf. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (REviSED) § 135 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
39. Low, No 'Crime'Few Punishments: A Search Through the Statutes, INSIGHT, Jan, 16,
1987, at 28, 29.
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"externally supported military operations"' 4 of Cuba. Defense appropri-
ations amendments of 1982 and 1984 by Senator Steve Symms recon-
firmed this policy.4" Nonetheless, it is the untouched international
consequences of the agreement which are of most concern.
B. The Presidential Remedy to the Sole-Executive Agreement
The President is authorized to suspend or terminate an agreement
according to its terms. He also may terminate or suspend an agreement
because of its violation by the foreign party, or because of supervening
events.42
The Constitution does not expressly allocate Presidential authority
to terminate or suspend international agreements.4 3 Yet the Presidential
authority to terminate a sole-executive agreement has never been ques-
tioned. 4 This provides a political means for the executive to reverse the
1962 agreement completely.
A President can unilaterally reject the 1962 agreement as nonbind-
ing on its own terms, or as having been violated, or as having been super-
seded by post-October 1962 events.45 President Kennedy's Assistant
Secretary of State Roger Hilsman,4 6 Kennedy's Special Counsel Theo-
dore C. Sorensen,47 and Kennedy's Special Assistant Arthur M. Schles-
inger, Jr., all point out that although the Soviets had agreed to United
Nations inspection of their 1962 withdrawal from Cuba, this U.N. in-
spection was frustrated by Cuban leader Fidel Castro.
Castro's resistance, however, made it impossible to establish the
U.N. inspection Khruschev had proposed, and the United States there-
fore never completed the reciprocal pledge not to invade Cuba....
For its part, the United States without formal commitment, refrained
from invasion and, indeed, took measures in the spring of 1963 to pre-
vent hit-and-run attacks by Cuban refugees from United States
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 163 (1965).
43. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 339 com-
ment a (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1975).
44. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED)
§ 339, Reporters' Note 2 (1985).
45. The 1962 agreement is nonbinding on its own terms as evidenced by the fact that
United Nations inspection of the 1962 weapons withdrawal never took place, although inspec-
tion was part of the agreement, infra note 48 and accompanying text.
46. R. HmsMAN, To MOVE A NATION: THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY 225 (1967).
47. T. SORENSEN, KENNEDY 811 (1966).
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territory.48
President Kennedy concurred in this observation concerning Ha-
vana's frustration of United Nations supervision of weapons withdrawal
in his announcement of November 20, 1962.49
President Reagan has also suggested that the agreement lacks au-
thority. In his radio address of December 14, 1985, Reagan asked:
"What are we to do about... Cuba's willful disregard of the 1962 Ken-
nedy-Khruschev understanding of which President Kennedy said,... 'if
Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive [C]ommunist purposes,
there will be peace in the Caribbean?' "50 President Reagan in 1983 had
concluded of the 1962 accord: "I hate to tell you, as far as I am con-
cerned, that agreement has been abrogated many times by the Soviet
Union and Cuba in the bringing of what only can be considered offensive
weapons, not defensive, there.""1 By 1985, Reagan had styled the 1962
agreement as an informal understanding devoid of legal basis. However,
Reagan's point may have had little impact upon the mainstream public
consciousness.
52
Political remedies to the difficulties raised by the 1962 Kennedy-
Khruschev agreement seem more realistic than any judicial recourse.
Not only does the October 1962 agreement appear constitutionally valid
in light of all of the foregoing, but contemplated litigation requires an
analysis of the standing and political question doctrines.
IV. THE STANDING DOCTRINE
Under the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the federal court extends
48. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., A THOUSAND DAYS: JOHN F. KENNEDY IN THE WHITE
HOUSE 762 (1967).
When then acting U. N. Secretary General U. Thant visited Havana at the end of
October 1962 to arrange for an inspection of the missile withdrawal, he and his mili-
tary aide, Indian Major General Indar Jit Rikhye, were introduced to "General Igor
Stazenko," who claimed that all Soviet forces in Cuba were under his command.
This statement, as well as his claim that the overall Soviet military complement in
Cuba was only 5,000 men, was not true.
Garthoff, Cuban Missile Crisis: The Soviet Story, Foreign Policy 61, 67-68 (Fall 1988).
49. R. HILSMAN, supra note 46, at 225; President Kennedy's Statement on Cuba (Nov.
20, 1962), in R. KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 216-17.
50. Address by President Reagan, White House Press Release (Dec. 14, 1985), at 2 (ellip.
sis in Reagan) (quoting R. KENNEDY, supra note 4, at 218).
51. Associated Press, Reagan Says Soviets Violated Treaty on Cuba, Wash. Post, Sept, 15,
1983, at A17.
52. Interview with Tom6s Regalado, El Miami Herald, Aug. 28, 1985, at 7. Raymond L.
Garthoff thinks Reagan had not referred between 1983 and 1987 to the 1962 understandings,
R. GARTHOFF, REFLECTIONS ON THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 106 (1987).
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only to actual cases and controversies.53 The standing doctrine raises the
question whether the plaintiff has a "sufficient stake" in a controversy to
obtain a judicial resolution. The standing test in constitutional chal-
lenges to federal operations is whether the plaintiff alleges that the chal-
lenged policy injured him in fact (economically or otherwise), that the
challenged policy caused the injury, and whether the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision.54
This standing requirement is an aspect of democratic theory."
Standing requirements keep courts from addressing issues not properly
before them and thus preserve the separation of powers, separating judi-
cial and congressional decisionmaking.56 To accord standing to "any-
one" would enhance the power of the judiciary and potentially render it
the dominant branch of government. 57 Every expansion of the definition
of standing is a contraction of the zone of democratic rule.58
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue,59 some of
the lower federal courts have found standing in members of Congress qua
member. Other courts have rejected this theory.' In terms of United
States-Soviet relations and the 1962 accord, the September 18, 1987, ex-
change between Senator Robert Byrd and Court of Appeals Judge Rob-
ert H. Bork before the Senate Judiciary Committee is of interest:
Senator Byrd. Well, the Supreme Court at some point in time
may have to-it may be confronted with this challenge on the part of
the Senate or both Houses and if you are on that court, you will be
confronted with that situation. And suppose the national security in-
terests are very much in the balance and there is no person per se who
can say that he has been injured by the act of the Executive.
53. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 2.
54. L. TRIBF, supra note 18, § 3-14 at 107-08.





59. Because a member of the National Treasary Employees Union had standing to chal-
lenge the 1985 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act it was unnecessary for the Supreme Court to
determine standing as to Members of Congress challenging the constitutionality of that Act in
1988. Bowsher v. Synar, 106A S. Ct. 3181, 3186 (1986); Swan, The Political Economy of the
Separation of Powers: Bowsher v. Synar, 17 CUMB. L. REv. 795, 810 (1987).
60. 1 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 33, § 2.13, at 147. Standing was
upheld for United States Senator Edward M. Kennedy in Kennedy v. Samson, 511 F.2d 430,
435-36 (D.C. Cir. 1974). United States Circuit Court of Appeals Judge for the District of
Columbia Circuit, Robert H. Bork, recalled on Sept. 18, 1987, "There was no Congressional
standing or any other kind of governmental standing until 1974 in this circuit." Sen. Byrd's
Questioning of Judge Bork, Miller Reporting Co., Inc., Sept. 18, 1987, at 149.
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Judge Bork. Well, I can-I am sorry.
Senator Byrd. But to let that decision stand would give succor
and comfort to adversaries, to the Soviet Union, let's say. And it is
imperative that somebody decide this, because if somebody does not
decide it, it is just going to stay, it is going to remain an impasse.
Now, are you saying to me that you are going to still, five years
from today, ten years from today, stand by that statement that you
made in the beginning. [sic] It was pretty much open and shut; we
ought to renounce outright the whole notion of Congressional
standing.
Judge Bork. Well, I certainly would renounce it outright as far as
the regular kind of case is concerned. I have never seen a case and I do
not know how I would react under the dire circumstances you state.
You know, the Supreme Court-I do not want to get myself into
trouble on another subject-but the Supreme Court has said no prior
restraints, but it has always kept the possibility of a prior restraints
[sic] upon newspaper publication in the case of a troop ship sailing out
in a war and the paper is going to publish where it is.
So there may be that enormous national emergencies like the
troop ship will alter law, but I have never faced a case like that, and to
tell you the truth, Senator, I have not thought about it.61
Thus, even Judge Bork, famous as an adherent to judicial re-
straint,62 concedes the theoretical possibility of the dire circumstances of
an enormous national emergency altering a no-Congressional standing
rule. However, even if a member of Congress took the role as a plaintiff
in assailing the 1962 agreement, it is not clear what injury the Congress
and individual members of Congress63 incur under the 1962 agreement.
V. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
The political question doctrine is better named the doctrine of non-
justiciability, holding the subject matter of litigation to be inappropriate
for judicial resolution."4 If the political question doctrine applies in a
case it renders the government's conduct immune from judicial review.
A standing issue can be cured by different factual circumstances, but a
nonjusticiability holding is nearly absolute.65
61. Sen. Byrd's Questioning of Judge Bork, Miller Reporting Co., Inc., Sept. 18, 1987, at
157-58. Cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
62. Neal, Robert Bork" Advocate of Judicial Restraint, 73 A.B.A. J. 82, 83 (1987).
63. Cf. Note, Unilateral Presidential Treaty Termination Power by Default: An Analysis
of Goldwater v. Carter, 15 TEX. INT'L L.J. 317, 348-51 (1980).
64. 1 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 33, § 2.16, at 181.
65. Id. at 182.
[Vol. I11
Cuban Missile Agreement
The key to the political question issue is the relationship between the
judiciary and the President and Congress respectively, not between the
judiciary and the states.66 The test is whether there is a "textually de-
monstrable constitutional commitment of the issue"'67 to the Congress or
the President. Admittedly, not everything impinging on foreign affairs is
thereby removed from judicial review.68 But assuming the 1962 under-
standing to be an executive agreement derived from the President's
power as Commander-in-Chief, such an agreement could present a polit-
ical question.
The federal judiciary can act as a referee between Congress and the
President. The Congress is constitutionally guaranteed a role in treaty-
making.6 9 However, the 1962 agreement is not held out to be a treaty.
Thus, the 1962 Soviet-American agreement does not impinge on Con-
gressional prerogatives, and so does not summon the federal judiciary to
serve as a Congress versus President referee.
Goldwater v. Carter7" exemplifies one such battle of constitutional
powers. Several senators, a former senator, and several members of the
House of Representatives sued for an injunction, claiming President
Carter could not terminate the United States-Republic of China defense
treaty without legislative participation. Their effort died in the Supreme
Court. Four justices concurred in an opinion by Justice William Rehn-
quist that the basic question was "political" and therefore nonjusticiable
because it involved the authority of the President in foreign relations, and
the extent of Congressional authority to overrule the President.7
Added to that four Justice plurality was the vote of Justice Powell,
who disagreed as to the Rehnquist "political question" theory, but who
reasoned just as unfavorably from the plaintiff's viewpoint. Powell re-
jected judicial review until the Congress, as a whole, officially rejected
President Carter's move; hence the suit was not "ripe."7 2 By analogy,
Powell would not let an individual plaintiff sue on the 1962 agreement
until the Congress expressly rejects the agreement and confronts the
White House.73
66. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
67. Id. at 217.
68. Id. at 211.
-69. U.S. CONsT. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
70. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
71. Id. at 1002 Rehnquist, J., (concurring in the judgment).
72. Id. at 997-98 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
73. Justice Marshall concurred in the Goldwater outcome to create a hostile bloc of six
votes among nine. Id. at 996.
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VI. THE CONTEMPORARY SITUATION
The judiciary's function is to apply law to redress legal wrongs.
However, no individual has been arrested, sued, or otherwise wronged by
the 1962 agreement. Congress has not been wronged: it can reverse the
domestic authority (if any) of the accord at will by statute. Nor is the
1962 understanding held out to be a treaty. The Presidency is not
wronged: the President can repudiate this international understanding at
will.
Potential litigants might want to wield the judiciary against the 1962
agreement, but the courts are creatures of the law. One cannot exploit
the courts without a plaintiff with standing or challenge the executive on
an issue determined to be a political question.
The preceding discussion focused on legally eliminating the 1962
Kennedy-Khruschev missile agreement by means of the United States
judiciary. This discussion assumed arguendo that the 1962 accord con-
stitutes an executive agreement, and hence is legally binding.
Based upon that hypothesis, efforts to remedy the 1962 accord
within the judicial branch are not possible. Consequently, it is necessary
to further investigate the utilization of the two political branches. Prior
political branch action to remedy parallel diplomatic commitments of a
bygone President may prove instructive.
VII. THE YALTA DECLARATION
The following discussion examines earlier moves by joint means of
the two democratic branches of the national government toward politi-
cally transcending a Presidential diplomatic commitment. This is fitting
since the incumbent administration already posits the 1962 accord to be a
mere politico-diplomatic arrangement of no legal force, rather than an
executive agreement. The importance of the agreement lies in the popu-
lar comprehension of the 1962 accord as a shield for the government of
Cuba rather than any legal significance thereof. Such erroneous public
comprehension can be reversed by Congress. The cautionary precedent
is the case of Yalta.
Scholarly opinion suggests that such policy declarations as the Yalta
Agreement-the Declaration of Liberated Europe74 promulgated at the
February 9-11, 1945, Yalta Conference-probably lack any American
legal status, let alone the status of an executive agreement. On the other
hand, President Eisenhower did view the Yalta pact as an executive
74. 39 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 105(1945).
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agreement although not as a treaty." President Kennedy's Special Assis-
tant Arthur Schlesinger, a respected historian of the Franklin Roosevelt
era," as recently as 1987 endorsed the Yalta declaration as supplying the
"juridical basis for continuing Western complaint over Soviet policy in
Eastern Europe.
77
By mid-March 1945 the USSR was violating its solemn Yalta
pledges by taking over both Romania and Poland. 8 John Foster Dulles
recalled in 1950:
At Yalta, Marshall Stalin may have seemed to agree to some re-
straining conditions. In fact, the Soviet Union never observed those
restraints. Once the Soviet leaders had what they wanted from the
United States, they went on to achieve their original objective, using
our concessions as a springboard for further aggressive expansion, a
further "redivision" of the world in their favor.79
Dulles' position is of special interest given his continuity of perspec-
five on prior American foreign policy."0 He was grandson and nephew of
two United States Secretaries of State; 1 he was the United States Secre-
tary of State between 1953 and 1959. His brother Allen Welsh Dulles
was director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and his sister Eleanor
Lansing Dulles ran the State Department's Berlin desk from 1952-
1959.82
VIII. THE ADVENT OF DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
During the 1952 presidential campaign of Dwight D. Eisenhower,
the Republican Party cleverly exploited public frustration with contain-
ment and the Korean War. The Republican Party alleged that mistakes
made by President Roosevelt and President Truman at Teheran, Yalta,
and Potsdam were responsible for the policy of containment and the Ko-
75. D. EisENHOWER, MANDATE FOR CHANGE 1953-1956, at 279 (1963).
76. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER (1956); A. SCHLESINGER, JR.,
THE COMING OF THE NEw DEAL (1959); A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLmCS OF UP-
HEAVAL (1960).
77. Schlesinger, West European Scholars Absolve Yalta, Wall St. J., June 16, 1987, at 30,
col. 4.
78. T. BAILY, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 778 (6th ed. 1958).
79. J. DULLEs, WAR OR PEACE 30 (1950).
80. J. KOLKO & G. KoLKO, THE LIMrrS OF POWER: THE WORLD AND UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1954, at 678 (1978).
81. IM
82. L. MOSELY, DULLES: A BIOGRAPHY OF ELEANOR, ALLEN, AND JOHN FOSTER
DULLES AND THEIR FAMILY NETWORK 13 (1978).
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rean war."3 John Foster Dulles inserted into the 1952 Republican plat-
form a withering attack on the Yalta agreement.8 4 The platform states:
Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam were the scenes of those tragic blun-
ders with others to follow. The leaders of the Administration in power
acted without the knowledge or consent of Congress or the American
people. They traded our overwhelming victory for a new enemy and
for new oppressions and new wars which were quick to come.
The government of the United States, under Republican leader-
ship, will repudiate all commitments contained in secret understand-
ings such as those of Yalta which aid Communist enslavements. It will
be made clear, on the highest authority of the President and the Con-
gress, that U.S. policy, as one of its peaceful purposes, looks happily
forward to the genuine independence of those captive peoples.
We shall again make liberty into a beacon light of hope that will
penetrate the dark places. That program will give the Voice of
America a real function. It will mark the end of the negative, futile
and immoral policy of "containment" which abandons countless
human beings to a despotism and godless terrorism which in turn en-
ables the rulers to forge the captives into a weapon for our
destruction.
85
By analogy to the Cuban case, parallel provisions in one or both of
the 1992 platforms would question the 1962 Kennedy-Khruschev agree-
ment. This 1952 platform alluded to a suspected "secret understanding"
from Yalta; such secret understandings have been suspected relative to
the 1962 Kennedy-Khruschev agreement.8 6 Similar to the 1952 plat-
83. J. SPANIER, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II, 74 (9th cd. 1983).
"The most vociferous charges of wartime mistakes relate primarily to our dealings with the
U.S.S.R., and particularly to the wartime conferences of Moscow, Tehran, and Yalta." (3.
KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950, at 74 (1951).
84. T. HOOPES, THE DEVIL AND JOHN FOSTER DULLES 60 (1973).
85. The Republican Platform, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 18, 1952, at 83-84. The
1964 Republican Party platform condemned the incumbent administration:
It has turned a deaf ear to pleas from throughout the Western Hemisphere for deci-
sive American leadership to seal off subversion from the Soviet base just off our
shore. It has increased the long-term troubles for America by retreating from its
pledge to obtain on the spot proof of the withdrawal of Soviet offensive weapons from
Cuba.
The Republican Platform, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 27, 1964, at 106, 108.
Republicans reaffirm their long-standing commitment to a course leading to the
eventual liberation of the Communist-dominated ... Cuba ....
Id. at 114.
86. Following a request under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982),
the State Department located 585 documents impinging upon the 1962 Cuban missile agree-
ment. It released in full 287 of these documents and released in part some of the others; the
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form's promise to reinforce the Voice of America would be a 1992 pledge
to expand Radio Marti.87 Denunciation of a "negative" policy of con-
tainment could be accompanied by a call for elimination of communism
elsewhere in the Caribbean if not in Cuba.
President Eisenhower was elected in November 1952 and inaugu-
rated on January 20, 1953. At his first cabinet meeting, Eisenhower read
his draft State of the Union speech and requested comments. Vice Presi-
dent Richard Nixon expressed a preference for a more aggressive assault
on the Democratic Party,8 but Eisenhower dealt cautiously with the
slender eight-vote Republican majority in the House of Representatives
and the tie in the Senate-breakable in the Republican's favor by the
Vice President's vote. 9 Nixon was in favor of outright "repudiation" of
Yalta as a symbolic repudiation of Roosevelt. 0 Except for the shift of
the Polish borders, allegedly not one provision of the Yalta pact ever had
been met.91
The relevant language and substance of the new President's Febru-
ary 2, 1953, State of the Union Message to Congress was dictated by
Dulles:
92
Our policy, dedicated to making the free world secure, will envi-
sion all peaceful methods and devices-except breaking faith with our
friends. We shall never acquiesce in the enslavement of any people in
order to purchase fancied gain for ourselves. I shall ask the Congress at
a later date to join in an appropriate resolution making clear that this
Government recognizes no kind of commitment contained in secret
understandings of the past with foreign Governments which permits
this kind of enslavement.93
This passage triggered wild applause from the Congressional Repub-
licans, as if in gratitude for assurance that such secret agreements indeed
existed.94 Many Republicans presumed that the proved resolution would
latter encompassed 10 White House documents released with excisions. Withholding of the
balance was held lawful under Freedom of Information Act exemptions. The Conservative
Caucus, Inc. v. United States Department of State, et al., C.A. No. 83-3107 (D.C.C. 1985).
87. Radio Marti, funded by the United States Congress, is the media counterpart in Cuba
to Radio Liberty in the Soviet Union, or Radio Free Europe in Central Europe.
88. S. AMBROSE, NIXON: THE EDUCATION OF A POLITICIAN 1913-1962, at 305 (1987).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 306.
91. Id.
92. E. HUGHES, THE ORDEAL OF POWER: A POLITICAL MEMOIR OF THE EISENHOWER
YEARS 76 (1964).
93. Full Text of Eisenhower's State of the Union Message, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Feb. 13, 1953, at 93, 94 (II 3).
94. E. HUGHES, supra note 92, at 76.
19881
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
reflect criticism of the late Democratic President Franklin D.
Roosevelt.
95
The Cuban case would have provided similar ammunition for criti-
cism of the 1962 Democratic President John F. Kennedy. But Republi-
cans today remember Kennedy far more positively than Republicans
remembered Roosevelt in 1953. Roosevelt was a political polarizer and
Kennedy was not. Only two years ago Congressman Jack Kemp quoted
President Kennedy eighteen times during one three-day campaign swing
in pursuit of the Republican Presidential nomination. 6 Moreover, it will
be seen that Roosevelt personally never proved a Yalta resolution target
at all.
97
IX. THE PROPOSED EISENHOWER RESOLUTION
By February 6, 1953, Eisenhower's United States Ambassador to
the Soviet Union, Charles E. "Chip" Bohlen (a choice of Secretary of
State Dulles)9" and Assistant Secretary of State Thruston B. Morton
were contacting the White House to ascertain the meaning of the State of
the Union Address since they were to draft the proposed resolution.99
President Eisenhower would later boast that he had written in most of
the "whereases" of the February 20 proposed resolution himself:' 0
Whereas, during World War II, representatives of the United
States, during the course of secret conferences, entered into various
international agreements or understandings concerning other peoples;
and
Whereas, the leaders of the Soviet Communist party, who now
control Russia, have, in violation of the clear intent of these agree-
95. Krock, Secret Pacts Bring Administration Woes, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1953, § 4, at E3.
96. Langley, Kemp Is Still the Positive-Thinking Quarterback Who Believes Opthnism Is
the Mother of Victory, Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1987, at 72, col. 1.
97. See infra note 104, which demonstrates that the attempted attack on Yalta only
viewed Soviet interpretations thereof.
98. S. ADAMS, FIRSTHAND REPORT: THE STORY OF THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRA-
TION 93 (1961).
99. E. HUGHES, supra note 92, at 76.
100. D. EISENHOWER, supra note 75, at 211. Eisenhower already had submitted in his
World War II memoirs:
I always felt that the Western Allies could probably have secured an agreement to
occupy more of Germany than we actually did. I believe that if our political heads
had been as convinced as we were at SHAEF [Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expedi-
tionary Force] of the certainty of early victory in the West they would have insisted,
at Yalta, upon the line of the Elbe as the natural geographic line dividing the eastern
and western occupation areas.
D. EISENHOWER, CRUSADE IN EUROPE 474-75 (1948).
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ments or understandings, subjected the peoples concerned, including
whole nations, to the domination of a totalitarian imperialism; and
Whereas, such forcible absorption of free peoples into an aggres-
sive despotism increases the threat against the security of all remaining
free peoples including our own; and
Whereas, the people of the United States, true to their tradition
and heritage of freedom, are never acquiescent in such enslavement of
any peoples; and
Whereas, it is appropriate that the Congress join with the Presi-
dent in giving expression to the desires and hopes of the people of the
United States: Therefore be it
Resolved, that the Senate and House concurring,
Join with the President in declaring that the United States rejects
any interpretations or applications of any international agreements or
understandings, made during the course of World War II, which have
been perverted to bring about the subjugation of free people, and
further
Join in proclaiming the hope that the people who have been sub-
jected to the captivity of Soviet despotism shall again enjoy the right of
self-determination within a framework which will sustain the peace;
that they shall again have the right to choose the form of government
under which they will live, and that sovereign rights of self-govern-
ment shall be restored to them all in accordance with the pledge of the
Atlantic Charter.
10 1
Eisenhower unveiled this proposed resolution to Republican leaders
at a White House conference. Their reaction was chilly. One senator
contrasted the 1952 platform promise to repudiate Yalta with the Eisen-
hower resolution's simple attack on Soviet "interpretations" thereof.1
0 2
The Republican Congressional leaders remained lukewarm to the pro-
posed Eisenhower resolutions, even when it was suggested that the Sen-
ate in its earlier ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty 03 had
stipulated that the United States would not recognize the portion of the
Yalta agreement delivering to the USSR off-Japan island positions. 104 At
101. White, Taft Bloc Upsets Yalta Resolution Eisenhower Asked, N.Y. Times, March 4,
1953, at 1, 6, col. 3. The Atlantic Charter is found at 35 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 191-93 (1941).
102. R. DONOVAN, EISENHOWER: THE INSIDE STORY 48 (1956).
103. Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, United States-Japan, 3 U.S.T. 3169,
T.I.A.S. No. 2490. This treaty was negotiated for President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of
State Dean Acheson by John Foster Dulles. D. ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION: MY
YEARS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT 539 (1969).
104. White, Republicans Face Foreign Policy Rift Over Secret Facts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17,
1953, at 1, col. 6. "By the time of Stalin's death, all that remained of the Yalta agreements,
from Russia's standpoint, was the possession of southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles." G. KEN-
NAN, RUSSIA AND THE WEST UNDER LENIN AND STALIN 382-83 (1961).
1988]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
the February 23 weekly legislative conference in the White House, Senate
Majority Leader Robert A. Taft, Sr., told the President that Republican
support in Congress would be limited unless the resolution were revised
to signal disapproval of Yalta. 105 But Eisenhower, who had been in-
volved in wartime settlements, was less eager to delve into Yalta than
was the Congressional wing of his party.
10 6
It was Dulles who had urged Eisenhower in the State of the Union
Address to avoid mentioning Yalta explicitly."' 7 When Taft refused to
support Eisenhower's resolution because it admitted the Yalta agree-
ment's validity, Dulles flatly asserted that the Yalta pact was indeed
valid.10 The Eisenhower administration feared repudiation of Yalta
would tend to legalize the Soviet subjugation of Central Europe.109
The British, however, explicitly recognized Yalta's validity. On
February 16, 1953, British Laborite Arthur Henderson questioned For-
eign Secretary Anthony Eden, a Conservative: "W:ill you make it quite
clear that, so far as the British Government are concerned, they do not
agree with the unilateral repudiation of any international agreements
which were voluntarily and validly entered into?" Eden replied: "Yes,
sir. That is our position, and it has been made clear."110
Here one sees that sustaining the validity of Yalta and the Western
interests in Vienna"' and Berlin1 12 was a serious concern of deci-
sionmakers. By analogy to the Cuban case, commentators doubtless
would mistakenly raise the alarm that United States denunciation of the
1962 Kennedy-Khruschev agreement would actually legitimize subse-
quent Soviet military moves in Cuba or Nicaragua, even though the 1962
accord is legally nonbinding.
By February 21, United States Representative John H. Vorys, han-
105. R. DONOVAN, supra note 102, at 49.
106. R. EVANS & R. NOWAK, LYNDON B. JOHNSON: THE EXERCISE OV POWER 77
(1968). In all fairness to that President, a more sympathetic account recalls of Eisenhower's
stance: "Eisenhower became increasingly annoyed by the determination of the Republican
Congressmen to use Yalta as a political weapon against the Democrats. To him, the Yalta
issue was a dead relic of the past and he had no sympathy with the eagerness of the Republican
politicians to rake it up out of the ashes." S. ADAMS, supra note 98, at 92.
107. S. ADAMS, supra note 98, at 92.
108. Id. at 93.
109. Ike on the Moscow Menace: It's Worse than You Think, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 2, 1953, at
21.
110. Daniel, Eden Defends U.S. on Far East Stand, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1953, at 8, col, 2.
111. The inter-Allied Command under Article 20(2) of the 1955 Austrian State Treaty
ceased to exercise any functions with respect to administering Vienna. State Treaty for the Re-
Establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria, May 15, 1955, art. 20, para. 2, 49
AM. J. INT'L L. 162, 168 (1955).
112. S. ADAMS, supra note 98, at 92.
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dling the Eisenhower resolution in the House of Representatives, as-
serted: "We are not going to repudiate any governmental commitments;
this draft does not state that we have any commitments based on these
secret war agreements. Certainly we have no commitments based on re-
pudiation of agreements by the Soviets." ' 3 Even Senator Taft came to
acknowledge that Senators generally would not prefer such strong reso-
lution language as "repudiation or denunciation.""1 4
The proposed Eisenhower resolution laid the whole onus of post-
Yalta difficulties upon Moscow and did not inferentially attack
Roosevelt.' 15 On February 26, Secretary Dulles testified before the
House Foreign Affairs Committee on behalf of the Eisenhower
resolution:
We, as a people never have acquiesced, and never will acquiesce,
in the enslavement of other peoples. Our nation, from its beginning,
was and is inspired by the spirit of liberty. We do not accept or toler-
ate captivity as an irrevocable fact which can be finalized by force or
by the lapse of time.
We do not accommodate ourselves to political settlements which
are based upon contempt for the free will of peoples and which are
imposed by the brutal occupation of alien armies or by revolutionary
,factions who serve alien masters.... 116
Dulles' final words evidently fit the Cuban case as observed in
1987117 by Dr. Andres Vargas-Gomez, the distinguished former Ambas-
sador of the Republic of Cuba to the United Nations in Geneva. Unfor-
tunately, Dulles' testimony underlines how the proposed Eisenhower
resolution did not reject the Yalta pact but merely constituted insubstan-
tial flag-waving. 118 Fortunately for future American purposes-since the
1962 accord is, as seen in Section III B, legally not controlling-such
113. Morris, Treaty Resolution Disappoints Wiley, But It May Stand, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22,
1953, at 1, 23, col. 4.
114. White, Democrats Warn Treaty Resolution Tests Unity of U.S., N.Y. Times, Feb. 25,
1953, at 1, 12, col. 4.
115. White, Bohlen Defends Yalta Pacl" Stresses Russia Violated It, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3,
1953, at 1, col. 4.
116. DEANE HELLER & DAVID HELLER, JOHN FOSTER DULLES: SOLDIER FOR PEACE
166-67 (1960) (emphasis added).
117. Vargas, La Demajagua, grito defe, El Miami Herald, Oct. 10, 1987, at 2, col. 3. Dr.
Vargas-Gomez, in the context of the 1962 missile agreement, highlights Eisenhower's Febru-
ary 2, 1953, pledge not to purchase fancied gain for United States security at the cost of break-
ing faith with friends by secretly agreeing to permit their enslavement. Id.
118. The Dulles testimony "outlines a stand which every American, regardless of political
party, can agree with and be proud of... ." DEANE HELLER & DAVID HELLER, supra note
116, at 166.
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simple enlightenment of public opinion on the point would serve an im-
mediate end. A Congressional resolution would affirm the free hand of a
United States diplomacy unchecked by the nonbinding 1962 accord.
By analogy to the Cuban case, the 1953 lesson appears to be that a
Congressional resolution transcending the 1962 Kennedy-Khruschev
agreement must be forward-looking to have any chance of success. The
thrust must prospectively affirm diplomatic freedom of action for a new
President rather than retrospectively attack the late President Kennedy.
The thrust thereof cannot be to bewail the errors of 1962 but to forestall
future mistakes.
X. AFTERMATH
A. The Foreign Relations Committee Amendment
The Eisenhower administration's proposal passed the House For-
eign Affairs Committee unanimously in late February 1953,119 Yet on
March 3, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 8 to 6 to attach
this rider to the Eisenhower language: "Resolved, that the adoption of
this resolution does not constitute any determination by Congress as to
the validity or invalidity of any of the provisions of the said agreements
or understandings." 120 Senator Taft had assigned himself to the Foreign
Relations Committee in January for exactly such contingencies.'
2 1
In response, the entire Senate Democratic leadership sitting as the
Democratic Policy Committee chaired by Senator Lyndon B. Johnson,
issued a statement noting: "The amendment, approved on a divided vote
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, would negate the resolution.
It would offer the Communists an excuse for their violations of interna-
tional agreements by raising a doubt as to the validity of the agreements
which have been violated."
1 22
By the March 5 death of Soviet Marshall Joseph Stalin, which pro-
vided an excuse to keep the Yalta resolution in the Foreign Relations
Committee, 123 the momentum behind a Yalta resolution had dissi-
pated.'24 No resolution of any type was ever passed.125 In fact, post-
119. White, Taft Bloc Upsets Yalta Resolution Eisenhower Asked, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4,
1963, at 1, 6, col. 4.
120. Id. at 1, col. 3.
121. R. EVANS & R. NOWAK, supra note 106, at 77.
122. White, Treaty Resolution Held Up As Crisis in Senate Mounts, NY. Times, Mar. 5,
1953, at 1, 7, col. 4.
123. J. PATTERSON, MR. REPUBLICAN: A BIOGRAPHY OF ROBERT A. TAFT 594 (1972),
124. Krock, "Secret Pacts" Action Runs Its Brief Course, N.Y. Times, Mar, 8, 1953, at 1,
col. 1.
125. R. EVANS & R. NOWAK, supra note 106, at 78.
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1945 Central European developments were-at least in the popular 26
mind-formally confirmed by the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on
Security & Compensation in Europe127 (the "Helsinki Agreement")
reached by, inter alia,128 the governments of the USSR and the United
States under President Gerald R. Ford.12 9
B. The Yalta Papers
Secretary Dulles apparently believed he would discover secret Yalta
agreements.130 In March 1955 the complete record of the Yalta confer-
ence was published. Congressional Republicans had voted funds to print
them and speed their issuance.1 31 Nothing sensational was found in the
complete record.1 32 It especially disappointed those expecting to expose
shameful secrets.
133
By analogy to the Cuban case, care must be taken not to herald lurid
revelations of secret 1962 undertakings. Such anticipation may spawn
disappointment should such secrets prove trifling or nonexistent upon
release of official documents or even upon publication of some unofficial
materials, such as the yet-unwritten memoirs of Kennedy's Secretary of
State Dean Rusk, 13  an international lawyer, or the written but as yet
unpublished memoirs of 1962 Soviet first deputy prime minister Anastas
126. G. FORD, A TIME TO HEAL: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF GERALD R. FORD 306
(1979).
127. 14 L L. M. 1292 (1975).
128. Former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger wrote memoirs totaling 2,690 pages.
H. KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS (1979); H. KISSINGER, YEARS OF UPHEAVAL (1982).
His indices disclose but a solitary page reference to the Final Act and to the related summit
conference. Id. at 1165. Dr. Kissinger thereby appears alert to the popular opinion that the
Final Act confirmed Central European Soviet hegemony.
129. President Ford attempted in his famous October 6, 1976, campaign debate with Gov.
Jimmy Carter to dispel the popular impression that the Final Act confirmed Central European
Soviet hegemony when Ford contended: "I don't believe that the Romanians consider them-
selves dominated by the Soviet Union. I don't believe that the Poles consider themselves domi-
nated by the Soviet Union." G. FORD, supra note 126, at 422-23. Ford, of course,
subsequently retreated from this stand. Id. at 423-25.
130. E. HUGHES, supra note 92, at 76.
131. J. BEAL, JOHN FOSTER DULLES: A BIOGRAPHY 175 (1974).
132. Id.
133. R. GOOLD-ADAMS, JOHN FOSTER DULLES: A REAPPRAISAL 174 (1962).
134. To be sure, Rusk was not a key missile crisis performer "During all these delibera-
tions, we all spoke as equals. There was no rank, and, in fact, we did not even have a chair-
man. Dean Rusk-who, as Secretary of State, might have assumed that position-had other
duties during this period of time and frequently could not attend our meetings." R. KEN-
NEDY, supra note 4, at 46. See also ROBERT KENNEDY: IN His OWN WORDS 18, 268 (E.
Guthman & J. Shulman eds. 1988).
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Mikoyan. 35 As recently as 1987 Dr. Daniel Ellsberg obtained access to
the 1962 telephone records of Secretary Rusk.'36
X. CONCLUSION
Brookings Institution senior fellow Raymond I,. Garthoff137 recog-
nized that Khruschev "publicly claimed there was an American
'pledge ' 38 not to invade [Cuba]-a claim unsupported by any official
American statement."1 39 On August 4, 1970, Soviet charge d'affairs Yuli
H. Vorontsov delivered a note to Presidential Assistant for National Se-
curity Affairs Henry A. Kissinger that Moscow hoped to reaffirm the
1962 understanding. 140 A mere oral statement from Dr. Kissinger to
that effect would have satisfied Moscow. 41 In response to the Soviet
request, President Nixon wrote Dr. Kissinger, "I want a report on a
crash basis on: (1) what CIA can do to support any action which will
irritate Castro .. ."142
Kissinger immediately asked the State Department for its records of
the accord. He later recorded that "It emerged that there was no formal
understanding in the sense of an agreement, either oral or in writing.
The exchanges were, however, sufficiently lengthy and detailed to consti-
tute mutual assurance.... Kissinger reported to Nixon:
The Khruschev-Kennedy exchanges indicate that there was an
implicit understanding that the United States would agree to give as-
surances against an invasion of Cuba if the Soviet Union would remove
its offensive missiles from Cuba under UN observation and would un-
dertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the re-introduction of such
weapons systems into Cuba. However, the agreement was never ex-
plicitly completed because the Soviets did not agree to an acceptable
verification system because of Castro's opposition. Consequently, the
United States never made a formal non-invasion pledge. The negotia-
135. Garthoff, supra note 48, at 63-64.
136. Hersh, Cubans attacked key Soviet missile base, Miami Herald, Oct. 11, 1987, at IC,
4C, col. 4.
137. Mr. Garthoff was a State Department participant in the 1962 crisis. Associated Press,
Soviet scholars revise account of 1962 Cuban crisis, South Bend Tribune, Sept. 4, 1988, at A7,
col. 1.
138. R. GARTHOFF, supra note 52, at 120, citing The Present International Situation and
the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, Report by Comrade N.S. Khruschev at the Session of the
U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet December 12, 1962, Pravda, Dec. 13, 1962.
139. R. GARTHOFF, supra note 52, at 82.
140. R. NIXON, RN: THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON 486 (1978).
141. H. KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS, supra note 128, at 633.
142. R. NIXON, supra note 140, at 485 (emphasis in the original).
143. H. KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS, supra note 128, at 633.
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tions between McCloy and Kuznetsov, which were designed to work
out a satisfactory means of formalizing the Kennedy-Khruschev "un-
derstanding" eventually fizzled out.
The "understanding" we have with the Soviets, therefore, is an
implicit one, which was never formally certified. Nonetheless, the So-
viets removed their missiles and there is no evidence that they have re-
introduced them; and the United States, of course, has not invaded
Cuba.'4
Kissinger recounts the August 7, 1970, United States reply to
Vorontsov: "It noted with satisfaction the assurance of the Soviet gov-
ernment that the understandings of 1962 were still in force. We defined
these as prohibiting the emplacement of any offensive weapon of any
kind or any offensive delivery system on Cuban territory. We reaffirmed
that in return we would not use military force to bring about a change in
the government structure of Cuba."
145
Garthoff emphatically avers that the United States has "consum-
mated"'14 a 1962-1970 pact. But the 1970 communication seems merely
to reassert ("stil") parallel and interrelated statements of policy ("never
made... formal") by the United States and the Soviet Union. Garthoff
himself quotes the remarkably diluted November 13, 1970, declaration of
a State Department spokesperson that "we are confident that there is an
understanding by the two Governments of the respective positions on the
limits of their actions with regard to Cuba."'4" Even Garthoff concedes
the unusual character of the statement, signaling a prior lack of confi-
dence that any such understanding had existed."' He further notes that
even key officials were unaware of the August Kissinger exchange of as-
surances, until revealed in the Kissinger memoirs nine years later.1
4 9
Garthoff suggests that the flurry of American concern during 1979
of the presence of a Soviet military brigade in Cuba' was something like
the closing act of the 1962 Cuban drama.' However, President Jimmy
Carter in his memoirs 52 does not even mention the 1962 arrangement.
5 3
Indeed, Carter quotes from his diary entry of September 5, 1979, that the
144. Id.
145. Id. at 634 (emphasis added).
146. RK GARTHOFF, supra note 52, at 96 (emphasis in original).
147. Id. at 97, quoting R. McCloskey, Dept. of State Press Briefing, (Nov. 13, 1970).
148. KL GARTHOFF, supra note 52, at 95.
149. Id.
150. Ide at 104-05; See also, D. NEwsOM, supra note 2, at 25.
151. See R. GARTHOFF, supra note 52, at 104-05.
152. J. CARTER, KEEPING FAITH: MEMOIRS OF A PRESIDENT (1982).
153. Id. at 262-64.
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Soviet troop presence in Cuba was "not in violation of any Soviet
commitment."
1 54
Moreover, President Carter's Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance's
discussion of Soviet military presence in Cuba during 1978'55 and
1979156 referred repeatedly to the 1962 "understanding"'' 57 and to Soviet-
American "understandings." 1 58 Also, discussion of that topic in the
memoirs of Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski re-
called that the "Soviets reconfirmed the 1962 bilateral understandings
made after the Cuban missile crisis."' 5 9 Furthermore, Carter's Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs David D. Newsom in his 1987
book recounting the 1979 Soviet military presence in Cuba entitled his
chapter on the 1962 agreement "U.S.-Soviet Understandings." 160 New-
som recounts that when he confronted Soviet charge d'affaires Vladillian
Vasev over the Soviet troops in Cuba, Vasev's inquiry for the "legal ba-
sis" of the United States query was actually in reference to "the 1962
understandings."'' 6  The language of Carter, Vance, Brzezinski, and
Newsom tends to discount the formal import of the 1962 accord.
Robert Turner, the State Department's Acting Assistant Secretary
of Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, clarified the legal status of
the 1962 accord in a letter dated February 4, 1985, to the House Subcom-
mittee on Europe and the Middle East Chairman Lee H. Hamilton: "I
should first note that the understanding is not a formal agreement, but
rather a political understanding between the United States and the Soviet
Union concerning Cuba."'162 Compare the administration's position that
President Reagan's 1982 joint communique with the People's Republic of
China163 is not an international agreement imposing obligations on either
party but just "set forth parallel and interrelated statements of policy by
the United States and China."'4
Turner corrects one of the two popular myths surrounding the ac-
154. Id. at 263.
155. C. VANCE, HARD CHOICES: CRITICAL YEARS IN AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY, 132-
33 (1983).
156. Id. at 358-64.
157. Id. at 132-33, 363.
158. Id. at 359-60.
159. Z. BRZEZINSKI, POWER AND PRINCIPLE: MEMOIRS OF TIE NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR 1977-1981, at 351 (1983).
160. D. NEWSOM, supra note 2, at 23-29.
161. Id. at 33.
162. 131 Cong. Rec. E. 414 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1985)(statement of' Rep. Hamilton).
163. Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Current Policy No. 413, US.-China
Joint Communique (Aug. 1982).
164. Wolfinger, supra note 11, at 332.
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cord. The first myth is that only Senate ratification can validate pacts
entered into by the President of the United States. 165 As previously ex-
plained in Section II B, sole-executive agreements are valid.
The second myth is that the 1962 accord controls United States pol-
icy as a matter of law or at least as a Presidentially supposed matter of
law. As Turner confirms, this too is a mistake. Since the 1962 Kennedy-
Khruschev agreement is a political (but not legal) problem, political
means can amend the agreement. A Congressional resolution would be
sufficient to solve the problem. The 1962 accord is valid and lawful, be-
cause President Kennedy was within his rights to declare the United
States policy. Nonetheless, the 1962 accord is not legally binding, as the
United States today can reject the accord with no legal consequences. A
Congressional resolution or Presidential declaration to that effect would
suffice to confirm that America's free hand is unchecked by the 1962
diplomatic formulation.
165. Perez, Un 'Facto'paralizante, El Miami Herald, June 24, 1987, at 4.
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